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Studies of economic phenomena in the post-socialist region often point out that the
businesses here have a particular affinity with informality and personal ties.1 Usually
focusing on different locations, the ‘new economic sociology’ revived Polanyi’s concept of
‘social embeddedness’ of the economic realm (Polanyi 1957) and documented in a variety of
settings and levels the fact that economic action cannot be understood if abstracted from other
relations between individuals and various entities (like firms, political parties or other
individuals).2 In a constant background dialogue with the liberal position that tries to
maximise the degree of autonomy of the economic realm, these studies make a strong case
out of the contrary: rather than an exception from the general/normal functioning of a
capitalist economy, the intermingling of these spheres is constitutive to it.
When it comes to the former socialist countries, it is still often the case that accounts of
informality and personal ties become instrumental for a different rhetoric. Personal ties
among economic and political actors are easily brought forth as arguments supporting the
thesis of an abnormal functioning of the economy in the region. This logic is still tributary to
the imagery of ‘unfinished transition’, in which the former socialist bloc is undergoing (and
having difficulty in completing) a process of rendering the economic realm into an
impersonal/autonomous one (for a comprehensive critique along these lines, see Borocz
2000).
By saying this we do not imply that any account of economic informality or any
documentation of cases of corruption and illegal actions referring to the postsocialist area
falls into this trap. The intention is simply to emphasise that the existence of strong formal
and informal ties between business actors can and should be discussed outside an a priori
framing of it as corruption with negative and suboptimal effects. Our paper introduces the
case of the business environment in the city of Cluj, Romania, as an occasion to explore
further the issue of the relationship between informality and situated economic action.
One of the salient aspects of the economic life of the city is the recurrence of a set of names
of business people who appear to be involved in most of the big economic events. The formal
and informal ties among these individuals become visible in the media coverage of the
various company merges, sells, or auctions. The local businessmen who are among the highly
ranked nation-wise (Capital 2006) appear to have strong ties among themselves. As
suggested above, one possible reading of these facts would point to a case of a corrupted
business environment, which can be dismissed as yet another indicator of a failed transition
to a healthy (i.e. impersonal) economic environment. We consider these categories to be
unproductive for an adequate understanding of the situation.
As a consequence, our paper explores two directions. First, we investigate whether our data
supports the hypothesis that the business world in Cluj is a strongly networked one (i.e. the
big local economic actors tend to be tied to each other to a greater extent than in similar
locations). Second, we ask why it is these particular actors that were successful in the current
reconfiguration of the city. By tracing back the different contexts in which a faction of the
1 We refer here to David Stark’s discussion on the strategies employed by economic actors in relation
to property of firms, where the fuzziness of demarcation lines is being maintained and used for
shifting liabilities towards the state and concentrating resources in their favour.
2 See for example, Krippner et al., 2005; Bandelj, 2002; Ansell, 1997; Padget, 1998; Padgett and
Ansell, 1993; Granovetter, 2005.
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economic elite in Cluj has been acting, we want to show how this informality was encouraged
by the changing macro conditions, how it came about in this specific form and in which way
it functioned as a resource contributing to the current success of these individuals. We
suggest that a simple reading of the situation in terms of corruption or unhealthy business
environment is analytically unsatisfactory.
Placing Business Networks in their Context: the Successive Stages of Post-Socialist Cluj
Cluj-Napoca3 is one of the largest Transylvanian cities, with a population of around 350,000
inhabitants that has great seasonal fluctuations due to the significant number of students that
attend one of its seven state and four private universities. It is the second university centre in
Romania, after Bucharest, and it attracts students from all over the country, although a big
share of them originate in Transylvania.
For social scientists, Cluj is mostly familiar due to its particular ethnic configuration and
manifestations that led to famous studies (like Brubaker et al. 2006). While the Hungarian
population represents around 18 per cent according to the last census, it had been around 30
per cent in 1989, 50 per cent in the 50s and over 80 per cent in 1941. After 1989 the local
administration had a strong nationalistic agenda, very easily visible in the omnipresent
colours of the Romanian national flag (red-yellow-blue) on various objects in the city,
starting with flags and going as far as patterns of tiles on the pavement, lamp posts and bins.
Apart from the symbolic level, this agenda also translated into strong economic protectionism
of the city, blocking the access of foreign investors and isolating Cluj from the global fluxes
of capital.
In the early 90s the new democratic institutional arena favoured a particular faction of the
local elites, namely the ones interested in promoting their ethnic agenda. In Cluj and
surrounding cities (i.e. Targu Mures), elections were won by politicians with primarily
nationalist concerns. An analysis of the parliament structure shows that, unlike the other great
university centres in Romania, the graduates of Cluj University that ended up holding a
position in parliament were associated either with the Romanian nationalistic party PUNR, or
the Hungarian RMDSZ (Culic 2002). Their professional background was mainly in the
Humanities, as opposed to the members of the parliament coming from the other university
centres, who had mainly technical degrees, and who typically held a managerial or an
administrative position (Petrovici 2006). Therefore, the local elite from Cluj that entered the
Bucharest scene and occupied a position which would potentially facilitate their direct
involvement in the process of national-scale resource distributions, were not business people
and had a predominantly different agenda.4 The political context blocked the mobility of local
managers to the parliament and therefore made it impossible for the business-oriented
factions to access the nationally distributed resources (Petrovici 2006).
A shift in the relation of the Cluj business world with the Bucharest political arena took
place between 1996 and 2000, when the liberal orientated political alliance CDR won the
elections at the national level. The main electoral pool of this alliance was Transylvania, and
Cluj became an important supporting pillar for the new political regime. These years were
marked by the massive privatisation of the biggest companies that were at that time still state-
owned. It is important to emphasise the differences between the ways in which the managers
3 Kolozsvár in Hungarian and K(C)lausenburg in German.
4 If they were interested, however, in business, it was to favour the Romanian capital over the
Hungarian one. Their main focus was financial and not productive, as was the case with the managers
or engineers seated in the parliament. An instance of this type of interests is the first Romanian bank,
which was founded in Cluj and had its major shareholders and managers openly favouring, or being
members of, the nationalist parties.
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from Transylvania and the ones from the rest of Romania positioned themselves in relation to
these reforms. Their peculiar position in relation to the Bucharest arena, a space occupied by
people with alternative agendas, led the Transylvanian managers to favour a strategy similar
to those from Central Europe. This translated into either selling the enterprises to foreign
investorswhile negotiating a managerial position for themselves, or into becoming part of the
group purchasing the enterprise. This differs from the logic of political capitalism, in which
managers sought the appropriation of assets and profits while transferring all the liabilities to
the state (Brown, Earle and Telegdy 2006; Earle and Telegdy 2001).
The new local administration that was elected in 2004 had a big impact on the way in which
both the city centre and its periphery started to get reorganisd. The symbolic fight over the
appropriation of the city in ethnic terms became less visible. Instead the reconfiguration of
middle-class consumption and its distinction patterns became more striking. The cafes in the
city centre became increasingly popular and a space of differentiation among the profile of
the highly educated and with above medium income users emerged and solidified (Petrovici
2011a). Five neighbourhoods (with varying levels of luxury, but extremely high prices) were
under construction and the first two big shopping malls opened in 2008, with a plan of having
two more in the following years. In the same year, Nokia, Siemens, Emerson, Bechtel,
Trelleborg, Auchan and Carrefour entered the Cluj landscape, leading to a reconfiguration of
the labour market and a new wave of population growth (both low and high educated) into
the expanding city. In early 2008, before the global economic crisis, the rate of
unemployment was estimated at less than 1 per cent, dropping from 3.5 per cent in 2004. It
was obviously a period of economic boom and of re-scaling of the local economy by a strong
interaction with the global sources of capital.
Placing Networks under the Formal Analytical Lens: the Research and Data
Our research design combines the formal analysis of networks with data obtained through
qualitative methodology (document analysis and interviews). We attempt to bring the
analytical insights of Social Network Analysis (SNA) of economic actors closer to the
substantive debates in sociology.5
Our initial knowledge of Cluj pointed at the configuration of the local business groups as an
important feature of the economic environment. In order to disentangle the particularities of
our case, we decided to make our endeavour an (asymmetric) comparative one. We
consequently chose Timisoara and Brasov, two other Transylvanian cities, as the points of
comparison. This decision was guided by previous research showing significant inter-
regional differences of firm profiles throughout Romania.6 The two other cities correspond
roughly to the same regional profile, but do not share either Cluj’s ethnic configuration, or its
history of local administration. We intended therefore to minimise the differences among our
cases in as much as their overall economic profile and size is concerned. The usefulness of
the comparison comes from the particularities of the local administration policies in relation
to foreign capital. While we cannot draw strong causal statements from the data we obtained
in this way, we believe the comparative observations are insightful for indicating the
5 The need to move beyond the mere description in formal terms of the interlocking directorates of
firms is signalled firmly by Mizruchi (1996). The technical tools should be used in order to address
more substantive sociological questions about the effects, causes or alternatives of these intersections
within the economic sphere.
6 Transylvania emerges roughly as being more oriented towards production than the other regions;
Moldova’s typical enterprise is trade oriented, while Southern Romania and Bucharest appear as more
orientated toward services destined to the multinational companies that are establishing their national
headquarters in the capital (Petrovici, 2011b).
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particularities of the economic trajectory of Cluj in the past two decades.
Inspired by the technical tools of the economic sociology literature focusing on interlocking
directorates (for an early review see Mizruchi 1996; for more recent analyses see Elouaer
2006; Schwarz and Lyson 2007), we used publicly available data7 for highlighting the
existing links among the individuals who own the largest companies in Cluj, Timisoara and
Brasov. Two types of networks were mapped out: one among companies, in which two firms
appeared as linked if they have a common share-holder; and one among the share-holders
themselves, in which a tie among two actors signified the fact that they appeared together in
the ownership structure of a company. We then used some of the techniques of SNA in order
to describe the resulting graphs.8
Comparing Cluj to Brasov and Timisoara
The standard measures used for characterising social networks have small absolute values
and did not indicate large differences among the three cities analysed (see Table 1 below). All
three networks appear as only loosely connected, while the differences in the values of the
indicators are too small to be considered statistically significant. For example, the indicators
for network density have very small values, ranging from 0.0016 to 0.0035. This means that
only 1.6 per cent of the total possible ties in the Cluj graph is actually observed empirically.
Also, the degree of network centralisation is very small, indicating overall large distances
among actors; on the contrary, for dense networks, these indicators should have high values
pointing at small differences among nodes. However, taking into account the fact that we
focused on relatively small firms and that we looked at the structure of property, not at
managerial boards, the small figures are hardly a surprise.
Cluj Braşov Timişoara
Size of shareholder boards 2.17 (1.71) 1.84 (1.75) 2.05 (1.15)
Number of components 252 182 202
Size of components (mean and Std Dev) 3.16 (3..8) 2.76 (2.35) 2.70 (1.17)
Bi components 297 192 210
%Growth BiComponents/Components 15% 5% 4%
Density 0.0016(0.0412)
0.0035
(0.0605)
0.0021
(0.0498)
Freeman’s Network Centralization 0.07% 0.38% 0.12%
Clustering Coefficient 0.419 0.459 0.569
Transitivity (undirected) 26.04% 28.38% 31.64%
Table 10.1. Descriptive statistics for the business networks from Cluj, Timisoara and Brasov
* All figures are our own calculations
While the differences between the densities of the three networks are not (statistically)
7 We purchased the publicly available Borg Design CD, which offered information on the economic
profile and structure of ownership of all active firms in Romania, we selected the top 200 firms in
each year from 2000 on. As the overlap between these rankings was rather high, we ended up
analysing the ownership connections among 610 firms in Cluj, 499 in Brasov and 469 in Timisoara.
8 The technical terms used in this paper are accompanied by footnote explanations. For a
comprehensive discussion of SNA techniques, as well as for further explanations of the technical
terms appearing this paper, see Wasserman and Faust, 1994.
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significant, there are differences in Table 1 that hint in the direction of our hypothesis. The
largest difference can be noticed for the Clustering Coefficient, which is a measure of the
degree to which the density of the network comes from the fact that it contains strongly
linked small sub-graphs, that are disconnected from each other; the smaller the value of this
coefficient, the more links exist among the cliques.9 Given the fact that the property structure
(from now on property board) of each firm represents a clique, the smaller clustering
coefficient suggests that there are more inter-board links in Cluj than in Brasov or Timisoara.
This would mean that in Cluj there are more individuals who simultaneously own two or
more firms. Following a related logic, the Transitivity Index shows the percentage of
transitive triads in the network; the more intransitive triads, the greater the chances that the
links they measure are inter-board and not simply intra-board.
Another set of differences supporting the same line of argumentation arose when we
approached the networks from the point of view of their components.10 The average size of
these components is larger than the average size of the property board, for each city,
indicating that there are also inter-board ties; the largest difference is, again, obtained for
Cluj. While the absolute number of components is difficult to interpret - as it can be easily
increased by a large number of small and disconnected firms - the larger number of
bicomponents for Cluj indicates that there are significantly more cutpoints here.11
A striking difference between the three cities emerged when we analysed the main
components of the networks, which is the largest sub-graph connected within and
disconnected from the rest of the graph. While for Timisoara the maximum number of nodes
belonging to such a component is 9 and for Brasov – 8 (visible in Figure 1), the main
component for Cluj comprises 57 individuals (its extended version is represented in Figure
2).
Figure 10.1. Main components of the Brasov and Timisoara business networks
9 We use ‘clique’ in its technical sense attributed by Social Network Analysis; it refers to a set of
nodes between which all the possible ties are realised. The board of each firm is a clique in this sense
because the very definition of ‘two linked nodes’ is given by their owning the same firm.
10 Components are the subgraphs that are connected within and disconnected from the rest of the
graph
11 Actors whose removal leads to the isolation of a component into two bicomponents are called
cutpoints.
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The purpose of mapping out the business networks in the three Transylvanian cities was to
find out first whether the local economic elite actors of Cluj are indeed strongly tied among
themselves, and second whether the degree of connectivity of the Cluj case holds some
specificity, or is rather to be encountered in all similar localities.12 Using SNA methods, we
realised the ‘very dense network’ is to be used only as a metaphor, as in absolute terms the
values for the overall densities of all three networks were extremely small. However, there is
indeed significant difference among the three networks when we look at sub-graphs of which
they are composed. In Cluj, the largest connected region of the graph encompasses most of
the big economic actors, both firms and individuals. Supporting our thesis regarding the
particularity of Cluj, there are no large connected sub-graphs in the Brasov and Timisoara
networks; the big economic actors in these cities are not tied to each other.
The Extended Main Component of the Business Network in Cluj: Ties and their Origin
After having gathered more data on the 57 economic actors comprising the main component
in Cluj, we decided to include some other firms that they own (but which were not included
in our original sample because they were not among the top 200 in the past seven years). As a
result, new ownership ties became visible between our initial firms. The enhanced main
component comprises more than 120 business people in more than 70 firms.
Figure 10.2. Property networks of individuals in Cluj 2007 (extended main component)
12 As highlighted above, the similarity refers to the overall profile as production oriented cities and
their size.
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As expected (Granovetter 2005), the apex of this network is Transylvania Bank, a very
successful locally founded financial institution. The other two centres of the network are a
real estate firm (IMO Finance) and a former state industrial firm, Tehnofrig. A closer look at
the profile of the firms included in the extended main component hints towards the existence
of a very powerful alliance between financial institutions, real estate firms, former socialist
enterprises, real estate development companies and transport companies.13 A smaller cluster
is formed by the car dealer firms and the leasing subdivision of the Transylvania Bank.
As for the business people themselves, most of them belong to business clubs such as Lionel
(4 clubs), Rotary (2 clubs), are well known to be friends and often share leisure activities.
Most of them have a university degree and their businesses can be traced back to the late
years of the socialist period. To take only two examples, the stories of the two most important
current businesses (Transylvania Bank and Astral Telecom) involve cooperation between
professionals who developed their ties in the informal socialist markets and later successfully
extended them on the unregulated post-socialist ones. One of the central nodes in the
network, Dorel Goia, is a former history teacher who started off his entrepreneurial activities
by distributing translated copies of films during socialism. The small-scale business based on
his passion for movies grew in time, especially as he teamed up with Horia Ciorcila. The
latter was an important player on the informal postsocialist currency market and for some
time he was involved in petty trans-border commerce. Together they created a cable
television firm that proved very successful in later years. The company, Astral Telecom, was
later sold to foreign investors, but the links between the two actors remained, and are
reflected in their ongoing common investments. Another line of business during socialism
was centred on dealing with cars and car components. The same Horia Ciorcila shared a
passion for cars and rallies with the Nicoara brothers; Titus Nicoara was an official referee
for rallies, and they were involved in organising both official and unofficial ones. These
activities later transformed into the transport companies that can be seen in the current
network.
The emergence of the strong network of solidarity among professionals in the city can be
traced back to the socialist logic of production on two interrelated dimensions. The first one
is a more general mechanism of sustaining the primary economy through informal
adjustments of the shortage economy. This needed strong and dynamic lateral ties between
managers and professionals (Verdery 1991; Szelenyi, Beckett and King 1994). The second
level is more intimately intertwined with the fact that their specific locality is an important
university centre in the country, and therefore the number of intellectuals endowed with
cultural capital is higher compared to other sites. As we could see in the examples above, the
numerous professionals favourably placed in the hierarchies of power (Szelenyi 1978) were
in a position to transact easily on secondary markets with money, cultural or other goods.
What followed after 1989 for these individuals was, as suggested in the previous section, a
period in which their main arena for action was forced to remain at the local scale. The
significant social capital they had acquired during socialism was used to mobilise
information, knowledge and capital in the context of local protectionism and the impossibility
of political capitalism strategies. This is a period in which the businesses became
consolidated and successful at the local level. While restricting their opportunities to reach
for the sources of global capital, the protectionist politics of the ultra-nationalist local
administration had an ‘incubating’ effect on the business people. By this, we mean that the
13 The former socialist enterprises have the advantage of being centrally located in the city on very
valuable estates. While they retain their initial profile once relocated at the outskirts, the land is
reconverted in profitable residential estates.
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Cluj business world became a very strongly networked one,14 and that actors ‘grew’ together,
as they had time to accumulate capital while being kept away from the crushing foreign
competition. After 2004, when their economic interests ceased to be restrained by an ethnic
agenda, and reforms at the national level induced a favourable economic environment, these
strongly networked actors began to interact successfully with the supra-national sources of
capital.
We are reluctant to classify this business network as a business group, at least following
Granovetter’s (2005) influential definition, ‘a set of separate firms bound together in a
persistent formal or informal ways’ (429). The links between the firms are shifting in time
and most of them are not persistent ones. What is persistent are the links between the
shareholders themselves.15 Our stronger claim is that these firms are not linked through
complicated networks of direct or indirect reciprocal ties as described in the classical study of
Stark (1996), but by their common shareholders, persons not firms. The nature of the links
suggests that this is far from being a type of recombined property strategy, employed in order
to create fuzzy borderlines between firms to permit dispersion of liabilities and concentration
of resources. Instead, it seems that in order to render the complex postsocialist environment
manageable – both its challenges and its opportunities – economic actors have engaged in a
process of diversification of the personal business portfolio through involvement in
specialised firms. Contrary to the recombined property thesis expectation, business actors
engage in drawing clear borders between firms, making easier the management process of
demarcated resources. In a context of specialised firms tackling only a small section of the
business multiple ownership permits the flow of information about opportunities. Therefore,
the informal ties among them were used as social capital that led to greater economic
efficacy.
Conclusion: Informality is not Black and White
The focus of our paper has been a particular faction of the business environment in the city of
Cluj, Romania. We started off from the hypothesis that there are long lasting informal ties
among the biggest local economic actors, visible in the coverage of the most important
economic events. First, by using the formal techniques of Social Network Analysis on
publicly available data, we discussed the hypothesis of the existence of strong ties. We
compared the situation in Cluj to that in Timisoara and Brasov, two cities from the same
region and of similar size, but with different ethnic configurations and history of local
administration. We concluded that indeed the case of Cluj holds some specificity in this
respect, as in the other localities, the largest business actors appeared as isolated and were not
involved together in owning firms.
After having established that the density of the local business networks is apparent from our
data as well, we proceeded to a discussion of the implications of this situation. With the
intention of avoiding a simplistic reading of this strong interconnectedness in terms of
unhealthy business environment, we attempted to untangle the way in which it came to be.
We traced back how these individual local-level strategies were developed during the various
14 As our discussion of the comparative side of our research indicates, it is one of the particularities of
the business world of Cluj that the richest individuals are strongly connected among each other. In the
other two cities we analysed, the wealthiest local individuals (according to the official ranking of the
richest 300 individuals from Romania, Top 300 Capital, 2006) were not linked among themselves
through the type of ownership structures we analysed.
15 The analysis on longitudinal network data is in progress. We base our claim on consistent
information hinting in this direction coming from the much-mediated public transactions and from our
interviews.
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stages of the intricate interaction between the local level political context and the national
economic and political sphere in the post-socialist era. We argued that most of these ties
emerged during the socialist period, as networks of lateral solidarity among professionals.
Further, strengthening the links among local businessmen was encouraged by the lack of
access to the national level of resource control and distribution. The economic protectionism
of the nationalist local administration allowed for an accumulation of capital that was
successfully used after 2004. Contrary to the recombined property thesis expectation,
business actors have been engaging in drawing clear borders between firms, facilitating the
management process of demarcated resources. In a context of specialised firms, tackling only
a small section of the business environment becomes more feasible and multiple ownership
permits the flow of information about opportunities.
By describing the way the different stages of Cluj as a locality have impacted upon the
opportunities and restrictions available for business, we aimed to explain the formation and
subsequent development of these informal ties. Our argument is that we should avoid any
priori assumption that this strong interconnectedness is a sign of corruption or of faulty
economic activity; the post-socialist location of this case does not make informality equal
illegality, corruption or inefficiency by default. However, assessing whether the activities of
these businessmen, the mergers, selling or division of firms among them were at all points
legal goes far beyond the scope of this paper and is not part of our argument. Our point is that
if further research focussed on these aspects, it would need to find evidence beyond the
existence of strong lasting friendship ties among businessmen, or the easily available
examples of multiple ownership.
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